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ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK
THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS BEHIND THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S DECISIONS IN R. v. SPARROW,
R v. VAN DER PEET and DELGAMUUKU v. BRITISH COLUMBIA
JONATHAN RUDIN*
SOMMAIRE
Dans cet article, on 6met l'hypoth~se que la meilleure d6cision possible attendue par
les plaideurs autochtones de la Cour supreme du Canada, dans une cause reli6e aux
droits autochtones, est une decision qui 6vite de trancher sur le bien-fond6 de la cause
elle-m~me mais qui renforce la main mise des plaideurs dans de futures n~gociations
pour determiner les droits en cause.
Si, apr~s avoir obtenu une telle decision, le gouvernement n'entreprend pas des
n~gociations sens~es, il est peu probable que la Cour intervienne de mani6re positive
en faveur des plaideurs autochtones. Cette hypoth~se est 6tudi~e suite A deux decisions
importantes de la Cour supreme du Canada en mati~re de droits autochtones, soit les
causes R c. Sparrow et R c. Van der Peet. Dans cet article, on 6tudie 6galement
comment la decision de la Cour supreme du Canada dans la cause R c. Delgamuukw
- cas de titre autochtone - correspond A la thtorie.
INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to provide some explanation for what appears to be a serious step
back by the Supreme Court of Canada in the area of Aboriginal1 rights. While the
decision in R v. Sparrow2 was seen as the high water mark of the Court's recognition
of Aboriginal rights, the subsequent decision in R v. Van der Peet3 appears to mark a
severe retrenchment in the Court's thinking. While the paper will provide some
analysis of Van der Peet, and a discussion of what is wrong with the frozen rights
approach to Aboriginal rights advanced in that case, the purpose of the paper is not
simply to criticize the Court.
© Jonathan Rudin, LL.M., LL.B. Jonathan Rudin is program Director at Aboriginal Legal Services
of Toronto. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.
1. For the purposes of this paper, the word "Aboriginal" will be capitalized. Capitalization of this word
is not universal. While the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples capitalizes the word, the
Supreme Court does not. The author of this paper draws no conclusions from this fact, but prefers the
approach taken by the Royal Commission.
2. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
3. [199612 S.C.R. 507.
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The paper will suggest that the decision in Van der Peet is best understood as a reaction
to the federal government's rejection of the Court's invitation to enter into substantive
negotiations with Aboriginal people contained in Sparrow. In order to understand why
the government's rejection had such an impact on the Court, the institutional limits to
judicial review will be described and the dialogic process by which the legislature and
the Court reach accommodations will be detailed. The paper suggests that the strength
of any particular Court decision depends on the extent to which it is accepted by the
legislature. In the area of Aboriginal rights, the Court cannot provide much support in
the face of significant political opposition to the expansion of such rights. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Del-
gamuukw v. British Columbia.4
MOVING FORWARD - R. v. SPARROW
Canadian courts (and before them colonial courts in Canada) have attempted to map
out the limits of Aboriginal rights since almost the beginning of contact between
Aboriginal people and European society. There is not the time or place here to provide
any sort of comprehensive outline or history of such cases. There is no question
however that the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, fundamentally changed the
way in which the Court approached the issue of Aboriginal rights. While Aboriginal
rights cases post-1982 continued to refer to the touchstone cases of the past,5 the
enactment of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act provided the courts with a potentially
radically new way of viewing Aboriginal rights.
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act states:
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal people of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed. 6
As with much else in the Constitution Act, 1982, the actual meaning of the key words
of s. 35(1) left much room for interpretation. What for example was the significance
of the term "existing' 7 and what did it mean to "recognize and affirm rights"? Does
4. S.C.C. File # 23799, judgement released December 11, 1997 (Supreme Court of Canada).
5. For example, St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 and Calder v.
A.G. B.C. [1973] S.C.R. 313 to name but two.
6. Section 35 goes on to state in subsection (2) that the term Aboriginal people refers to Indian, Inuit
and Metis.
7. The word "existing" did not appear in the initial draft of s. 35(1). There is no question that the addi-
tion of the word was done to bring recalcitrant provinces on board. These provinces opposed the
entrenchment of any declaration of Aboriginal rights due to a fear of what a court might do with the
section. For those provinces, the meaning of the word 'existing' was clear, it froze those rights -
whatever they might be - at the level they were as of the enactment of the Charter in 1982. (E.
Mendes and P. Bendin, The New Canadian Charter of Rights, International Law and Aboriginal
Self-Determination: A Proposal for a New Direction (Vancouver: 1983) at 32).
Had the provinces known that the Supreme Court of Canada would so quickly and completely reject
the notion of "original intent" (in Reference re s. 94 (2) of the Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 S.C.R.
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the fact that s. 35(1) is outside of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms mean that
government cannot rely on the justificatory standards of s. 1 of the Charter allowing
otherwise unconstitutional actions of the government to be upheld by the Court in
Aboriginal rights cases?
Section 35(1) generated much debate and discussion in legal and political circles. A
constitutional conference, called under the terms of s. 35 in 1984, attempted to flesh
out some of the section's concepts but failed to provide any further. guidance. It was
thus left to the courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada in particular, to determine
the meaning of s. 35(1). This process began in earnest with the decision in R v.
Sparrow.
Sparrow was a unanimous decision of the court, written by Chief Justice (at the time)
Dickson and Justice La Forest. The case allowed the court, for the first time, to publicly
reflect on the meaning of s. 35(1). Sparrow arose as a result of a dispute regarding the
allowable fish catch for members of the Musqueam First Nation. Provincial regula-
tions restricted the manner in which the Musqueam could fish for food for personal
use. This restriction in methods of catching fish had an impact on the number of fish
that could be caught.
The court began its analysis by examining the meaning of the word "existing" in s.
35. The court rejected the notion that "existing rights" meant rights currently in
existence and being exercised as of the date of the proclamation of the Constitution
Act since that would create "a crazy patchwork of regulations."'8 The court instead
opted for a notion of "existing rights" that allowed for the evolution of rights over
time, an evolution that would affirm Aboriginal rights in their contemporary form.9
The court then went on to consider how a government might go about proving that an
Aboriginal right no longer existed - that it had been extinguished. The court took as
a starting point the proposition that governments could, unilaterally, extinguish
Aboriginal rights. Indeed, that notion was never challenged in the decision. Rather,
the court focused its attention on distinguishing between regulation and extinguish-
ment. The court concluded that in order to prove extinguishment, "...the Sovereign's
intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal right." 10
In the case before the Court, the fact that the government had regulated the fishery for
years and had thus exercised significant powers over the manner of fishing and the
amount of fish to be caught by Aboriginal people, could not be seen as extinguishing
the Aboriginal right, it was simply an example of the regulation of the right. As a result,
the right to fish remained protected by s. 35(1).
486) in searching for the meaning of terms in the document, perhaps they would not have signed on
as quickly.
8. Supra, note 2 at 1091.
9. Ibid., at 1093.
10. Ibid., at 1099.
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Finally, the court addressed what the implications were of the recognition of existing
Aboriginal rights. The court took the opportunity to reflect on the nature of Aboriginal-
government relations over time and to suggest a new context for such relations. The
court noted that "for many years, the rights of Indians to their aboriginal lands -
certainly as legal rights - were virtually ignored"'1 and that the Constitution Act
represented a political victory for Aboriginal people: 12
It is clear that then, that s. 35 (1) ...represents the culmination of a long and difficult
struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition
of aboriginal rights...Section 35(1)., at the least, provides a solid constitutional base
upon which subsequent negotiations can take place. 13
The court further stated that s. 35(1) should be interpreted in the same manner as other
sections of the Constitution Act, in a purposive manner, and in the context of
Aboriginal rights, such a purposive approach demands "a generous and liberal inter-
pretation of the words [of s. 35(1)]."14 The court went on to state that this approach
must take into account the fiduciary relationship between government and Aboriginal
peoples:
The relationship between the government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must
be defined in light of this historic relationship. 15
At the same time, the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights did not mean
that they now immediately blossomed to their full potential, suddenly free from any
government restrictions. While s. 35 (1) does not contain within it any justificatory
provisions analogous to s. 1 of the Charter, the court nevertheless felt it necessary to
import such a standard to the section. The court was cognizant of the concern that
Aboriginal peoples might have of the manner in which such standards might be used
by governments:
Our history has shown, unfortunately, all too well, that Canada's aboriginal peoples
are justified in worrying about government objectives that may be superficially
neutral but which constitute defacto threats to the existence of aboriginal rights and
interests. By giving aboriginal rights constitutional status and priority, Parliament
and the provinces have sanctioned challenges to social and economic policy objec-
tives embodied in legislation to the extent that aboriginal rights are affected. Im-
plicit in this constitutional scheme is the obligation of the legislature to satisfy the
test of justification. The way in which a legislative objective is to be attained must
uphold the honour of the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique contem-
11. Ibid., at 1103.
12. This political victory was obviously not as apparent to Aboriginal peoples themselves who lobbied
against the patriation of the Constitution in Canada and in Britain as they felt it did not further
Aboriginal aspirations.
13. Supra, note 2 at 1105.
14. Ibid., at 1106.
15. Ibid., at 1108.
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porary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the Crown and
Canada's aboriginal peoples. 16
The justificatory standard imported into s. 35 by the court for Sparrow, not surpris-
ingly, greatly resembled the test developed by the court for s. 1 cases under the
Charter.17
Sparrow offered a possible reinvigoration of the notion of Aboriginal rights. The
rejection by the Court of the frozen rights doctrine and the requirement that the
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, while still possible, could only be achieved by
explicit, clear and plain language, appeared to open new doors for a contemporary
recognition of Aboriginal rights. While obviously cognizant of the significance of the
decision, the Court did emphasize that this particular case dealt with the assertion of
a particular type of Aboriginal right - the right to fish for food for personal and
ceremonial purposes - and that, as with all other types of cases, the contours of s. 35
would be developed over time on a case by case basis. 18 This then leads us to R v. Van
der Peet.
MOVING BACK - R. v. VANDER PEET
R v. Van der Peet was the Supreme Court's first major elaboration on the principles
addressed in Sparrow.19 As in Sparrow, the fact situation centred on claims of
Aboriginal rights arising from fishing in British Columbia. Unlike Sparrow, the claim
in this case was to more than simply a right to fish for food and for ceremonial purposes
but included the aspect of trading fish caught for other goods. The case was heard by
a full nine-judge panel and while there were two dissents,2 0 the majority of seven
judges spoke with one voice, the majority judgement coming, as in Sparrow, from the
Chief Justice, in this case Antonio Lamer.
At the outset of the judgement, Chief Justice Lamer stressed that the rights protected
in s. 35(1) are those rights that can somehow be seen to be distinctly Aboriginal rights:
16. Ibid., at 1110.
17. The justificatory standard would require the Court to answer questions such as: Is there a valid legis-
lative objective? Was there as little infringement as possible? Was there consultation with the
Aboriginal group affected? Ibid., at 1113-1114, 1119.
18. Ibid.,at llll.
19. There is a tendency to speak of the Supreme Court as an entity that somehow exists outside of the
nine individuals who make it up. While this tendency is one that is encouraged by the Court, since it
emphasizes the permanency and stability of Court decisions, one cannot totally separate the members
of the Court from the decisions made by the Court. Where the issue is one of Aboriginal rights it
surely cannot be insignificant that one of the authors of Sparrow, Chief Justice Dickson, was no
longer on the Court when Van der Peet was heard. Also missing from the Sparrow panel in Van der
Peet was Justice Wilson who, by the time the decision was rendered, had completed her rather
lengthy term as a member of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
20. Justices L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin each wrote dissenting judgements in the case. Unlike other
cases before the Court where these two judges were alone in dissent, there has been little discussion
of a gender gap issue with regard to the interpretation of Aboriginal rights.
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Section 35 (1) it is true, recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal rights, but it must
not be forgotten that the rights it recognizes and affirms are aboriginal. 21
From that starting point, Chief Justice Lamer then elaborated on the purposive
approach to s. 35(1) originally developed in Sparrow:
...the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s. 35
(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America,
aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and par-
ticipating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries.22
The next step in the court's analysis was to develop a test for identifying Aboriginal
rights protected by s. 35 (1). At the outset of the discussion in this area, Chief Justice
Lamer stated the essence of the court's position:
...the test for identifying the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1)
must be directed at identifying the crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive
societies. It must, in other words, aim at identifying the practices, traditions and cus-
toms central to the aboriginal societies that existed in North America prior to con-
tact with the Europeans. 23
For the Court, in order for an Aboriginal right to be recognized as deserving of
protection by s. 35 (1) it must, at minimum, be a right that was exercised prior to
contact with Europeans. The fact that contact with Europeans preceded any real
attempt by Europeans to assert sovereignty over the lands occupied by Aboriginal
peoples is not relevant. For Chief Justice Lamer, since Aboriginal rights are founded
on the notion that Aboriginal people were in Canada prior to the arrival of Europeans,
then it is the period prior to the arrival of Europeans - pre-contact - that is relevant
in determining whether or not Aboriginal people carried on practices that could now
be protected as Aboriginal rights. In the case at bar, the fact that the Aboriginal accused
could not prove that some form of trading of fish for other goods took place prior to
European contact, they were unable to rely on the provisions of s. 35 (1).24
The approach taken by the Court in Van der Peet, appears to run counter to the
admonitions in Sparrow that Aboriginal rights in s. 35(1) evolve over time and should
21. Supra, note 3 at 534 (emphasis in original).
22. Ibid., at 538 (emphasis in original).
Chief Justice Lamer then goes on to state:
"It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from
all other minority groups on Canadian society and which mandates their special legal,
and now constitutional, status."
This recognition of the distinctive nature of Aboriginal claims as apart from the claims of ethnic or
cultural minorities is often missing from political discourse which tends to lump Aboriginal people in
with all other non-majority culture groups.
23. Ibid., at 548.
24. Ibid., at 568.
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not be frozen at any particular historical period. Chief Justice Lamer addressed this
issue by emphasizing that the concept of continuity of Aboriginal traditions and
practices avoids this problem:
The concept of continuity is...the means by which a "frozen rights" approach to s.
35(1) will be avoided. Because the practices, traditions and customs protected by s.
35(1) are ones that exist today, subject only to the requirement that they be
demonstrated to have continuity with the practices, customs and traditions which
existed pre-contact, the definition of aboriginal rights will be one that, on its own
terms, prevents those rights from being frozen in pre-contact times. The evolution
of practices, customs and traditions into modem forms will not, provided that con-
tinuity with pre-contact practices, customs and traditions is demonstrated, prevent
their protection as aboriginal rights. 25
The concept of continuity of traditions and practices means that contemporary
manifestations of Aboriginal rights are protected. For example, if an Aboriginal right
to fish for food is established under s. 35(1), that right is not restricted to the manner
in which fish were caught at the time of contact. In this regard, Chief Justice Lamer
is correct in saying that Van der Peet is consistent with Sparrow. On the other hand
- and much more significantly - by stating that in order to recognize an Aboriginal
right it must be proven that the right was exercised at the time of contact, Van der Peet
is freezing Aboriginal rights at a particular point in time, in contrast to what the Court
said in Sparrow.
This notion of freezing the development of Aboriginal rights at the time of contact is
a problematic one. The Court actually spent little time explaining the rationale for the
theory, although it did spend time defending the theory from criticism as we will see.
In her dissent, Justice L'Heureux-Dube identified five problems with the frozen rights
approach.
The first problem with the frozen rights approach is that it overstates the significance
to Aboriginal people of the impact of contact with Europeans. 26 Aboriginal societies
were often in contact with other societies. The results of these contacts could be quite
dramatic. In some cases there might be wars conducted, in others, trading of some sort
might have been carried out. The interaction between different societies will always
have an effect on the development of those societies. Why should we assume that the
act of contact with Europeans was of any greater significance to Aboriginal people in
terms of form or content than contact with other Aboriginal societies? In fact, given
the generally poor state in which Aboriginal people found the first European explorers
to Canada, it is certainly questionable as to what degree of significance they attached
to contact with a rag tag group of men in danger of dying of starvation or freezing to
death through the winter. We will return to the perspective of Aboriginal people to
contact later.
25. Ibid., at 557.
26. Ibid., at 596-7.
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Justice L'Heureux-Dube also pointed out that relying on contact as the time for closing
off the development of Aboriginal rights is both arbitrary and confusing. 27 There is of
course the question of when contact occurred. L'Heureux-Dube asked which of the
visits of Cabot, Cartier or Verrazzano represents European contact?28 One could go
further of course. There is evidence that Vikings landed in Newfoundland well before
the arrival of John Cabot. Since the Vikings came from Europe, did this contact,
assuming that there was contact, serve as the cut-off date for the development of
Aboriginal rights protected by s. 35 (1)?29 On the West Coast there may be evidence
that contact was made with explorers from Asia prior to contact with Europeans, does
that contact serve as the end point for the development of Aboriginal rights? 30
Anthropological evidence now suggests that there may have been non-Aboriginal
peoples on the West Coast thousands of years ago. Would contact with these non-
Aboriginal people freeze the development of Aboriginal rights at the time of that
contact?
Historical and anthropological evidence regarding contact between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada is constantly under review. Would future evidence
revising the time of contact back in time result in revisions of what constituted
Aboriginal rights? Could a finding of the Court in say, 1998, that the Aboriginal rights
of a particular First Nation were to be determined based on contact at one date be
subject to revision by a subsequent Court if earlier contact were later proven?
Related to this problem is of course the fact that Aboriginal societies came into contact
with European explorers at different times. If the cut-off date for the development of
Aboriginal rights was a declaration of sovereignty by Britain or France at a time when
such a declaration could have been legitimately supported, then at least the theory
would have the virtue of providing a consistent date for the freezing of rights across
the country. If simple contact is all that is required however, then it would seem that
Aboriginal rights would crystallize in different places at different times, presumably
allowing for the prospect that different Aboriginal societies would be able to assert
different rights today.
Take for example, a tribe living in close proximity to a European settlement. Based
on the majority reasoning, if a trade in goods emerged as a result of this contact - a
trade that previously was not engaged in by the tribe - then the trade could not be
seen to be an Aboriginal right because it occurred after contact. 31 If that tribe then
27. Ibid., at 597.
28. Ibid.
29. With regard to this point Justice McLachlin states in her dissent:
"For example, there are those who assert that Europeans settled the eastern maritime
regions of Canada in the 7th and 8th century A.D. To argue that aboriginal rights
crystallized then would make little sense..." Ibid., at 635.
30. Denying the impact of this contact, would seem to be an example of a truly Euro-centric bias in the
Court.
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went out into the country and began trading with other tribes who had not had contact
with the European settlers, does that mean that the second tribe now has established
an Aboriginal right to trade while the first tribe has not? Conversely, has the second
tribe, experienced, unbeknownst to them, de facto contact with European society
through dealings with the first tribe?
The third problem Justice L'Heureux-Dube raised with the test is that it imposes a
heavy burden on Aboriginal claimants to provide evidence of their practices prior to
contact. For Justice L'Heureux-Dube, this "constitutes a harsh burden of proof."'32
Justice L'Heureux-Dube's fourth difficulty with the frozen rights theory was that it
appears to negate any recognition of Aboriginal rights for Metis people. 33 Metis
society only emerged following significant, continued contact of the most intimate
sort with Europeans. Metis people cannot point to any pre-contact experience at all.
Yet s. 35 (2) defines Aboriginal people as including Metis. How therefore can Metis
people have any rights affirmed and recognized under s 35 (1) under this theory? 34
Finally, in contrast to Chief Justice Lamer's assertion that the decision is consistent
with earlier decisions of the Court, Justice L'Heureux-Dube contended that the frozen
rights approach contradicts the position taken by the Court in Sparrow. She relied on
the portion of that judgement which stated:
...the phrase "existing aboriginal rights" must be interpreted flexibly to so as to per-
mit their evolution over time.. .an approach to the constitutional guarantee embodied
in s. 35 (1) which would incorporate "frozen rights" must be rejected. 35
In addition to the concerns raised by Justice L'Heureux-Dube, perhaps the most
serious problem with the frozen rights test is that it approaches the significance of
contact between Aboriginal peoples and Europeans with no regard for the way in
which this contact was actually viewed by Aboriginal people. This is particularly
distressing as the Court itself emphasized in Van der Peet that in assessing what is
integral to Aboriginal culture "Courts must take into account the perspective of
aboriginal peoples themselves." 36
31. Unless of course it could be proven that such trade pre-dated contact.
32. Supra, note 3 at 598.
33. Ibid.
34. Chief Justice Lamer does respond to this objection in the judgement. He states that while s. 35 in-
cludes Metis as Aboriginal peoples of Canada, they have had a distinctly different history than have
Indians and Inuit. As a result, the court will wait for the appropriate case to determine the scope of
Metis Aboriginal rights under s. 35. Ibid., at 558.
While this approach would recommend itself to a court interested in a case by case development of
constitutional rights, it is certainly not clear that s. 35(1) contemplated distinctly different Aboriginal
rights among Indians, Inuit and Metis.
35. Supra, note 3 at 599, citing Sparrow at 1093 (emphasis added by L'Heureux-Dube).
36. Supra, note 3 at 550.
(1998) 13 Journal of Law and Social Policy
One might think that this would be a crucial issue in the quest for the determination
of the nature of existing Aboriginal rights in Canada. It order to make a case that
Aboriginal rights should be frozen at the time of first contact, some information
regarding the way in which Aboriginal people viewed this contact with Europeans
would be significant.
The frozen rights model developed by the Court is one which assumes the character
of the development of Aboriginal culture, as a unique culture, occurred over centuries
only to come to a halt when contact was made with Europeans. While clearly
Aboriginal culture continued to develop after contact, the Court is saying that the
nature of this development differs qualitatively from prior developments. The only
possible difference of course, is that the contact in this case was not with other
Aboriginal people but with Europeans. One might be able to make a case from the
European point of view on the impact of such contact, but such a viewpoint does have
a self-serving aspect to it. It would not be unusual at all for Europeans to over-exag-
gerate the impact they had on the development of Aboriginal culture. As noted earlier,
the nature of first contact with Aboriginal peoples by European explorers was not often
one that suggested that the Europeans brought anything of significance to the land
other than the need for assistance in basic survival.
On the other hand, there appear to be great practical difficulties in attempting to
determine the state of mind of Aboriginal people at the time of contact. How can the
Court, hundreds of years later, make any sort of meaningful determination as to the
state of mind and intentions of Aboriginal people at the time of contact? How can the
Supreme Court of Canada, nine, non-Aboriginal lawyers, come to grips with the
perspective brought to bear by Aboriginal people meeting Europeans for the first time.
Inviting the court to engage in this type of speculation would appear to be fruitless.
For practical reasons alone then, it may well be that, despite admonitions to consider
the perspectives of Aboriginal people, the court really has no practical way of making
this a reality.
John Borrows addresses this issue in an article entitled Constitutional Law from a First
Nation Perspective.37 Borrows maintains that in looking at issues from a First Nations
perspective, different interpretations of historical legal documents will be revealed.
The significance of this approach is that:
Since the source of judicial power often cascades from the dominant group's
ideological headwaters, bias spills into the pages of legal decisions from a contex-
tualized, politically hued stream. The ideological undertones of judicial decisions
are revealed when reviewed through the eyes of communities that are disadvantaged
by the exercise of legal power. Alternative meanings can be assigned to legal
doctrines as people with a different source and colour of ideological values provide
their insights. Situating the interpretations and consequences of judicial decisions in
37. John Borrows, "Constitutional Law From a First Nations Perspective," originally published in
University of British Columbia Law Review 28 (1): 1-47, cited here from Thomas Isaac (ed.) Read-
ings in Aboriginal Studies (Manitoba: Bearpaw Publishing, 1996).
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affected communities gives a voice to people who are disadvantaged by the applica-
tion of law.38
In his article Borrows illustrates how such a perspective could inform the court's
understanding of documents such as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the sub-
sequent Treaty of Niagara. While the Royal Proclamation is often seen as a declaration
of sovereignty by Britain over North America, from a First Nations perspective it could
also be seen as a declaration ensuring Aboriginal sovereignty over Aboriginal lands.
39
Borrows contends that the Proclamation intentionally fostered both viewpoints in
order to accomplish the goals Britain had for the region in the political context in
which they were operating. 40 To support this thesis, Borrows relies on the Treaty of
Niagara of 1764. The Treaty of Niagara, one of the first treaties to be signed following
the Royal Proclamation, and thus presumably entered into by Britain in the spirit of
the Proclamation, confirmed to Aboriginal people that they were not giving up their
sovereignty to Britain. 41 The treaty was an incredibly significant event in Aboriginal-
British relations. Over two thousand chiefs representing over twenty-four nations from
Nova Scotia to Mississippi to Hudsons Bay gathered for the treaty making.42
The use of term treaty-making is significant here. There is a tendency in Western legal
thought to speak of treaty signings and to place the emphasis on the words used in the
treaties in order to determine their meaning. Other discussions or manifestations of
intentions between the parties at the time are regarded as insignificant or tangential.
Borrows points out the treaty was made by the exchange of presents and wampum
belts in addition to signings. The Aboriginal representatives relied on the two-row
wampum to signify their acceptance of the treaty. The two-row wampum was not a
new feature in Aboriginal-British negotiations, indeed it had been a fixture of them.
Borrows quotes Robert A. Williams. Jr., an Aboriginal legal scholar on the significance
of the two-row wampum:
When the Haudonesaunee [Iroquois] first came into contact with the European na-
tions, treaties of peace and friendship were made. Each was symbolized by the Gus-
Wen-Tah, or Two Row Wampum. There is a bed of white wampum which
symbolizes the purity of the agreement. There are two rows of purple, and these two
rows have the spirit of your ancestors and mine. There are three beads of wampum
separating the two rows they symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling down
the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people and
their laws, their customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side
by side, but in our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.43
38. Ibid., at 88-89 (footnotes omitted).
39. Ibid., at 104-105.
40. Ibid., at 105.
41. Ibid., at 107.
42. Ibid., at 109.
43. R. A. Williams, Jr."The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence" (1996) Wisc. L. Rev. 219, 291 cited in Bor-
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The use of the two-row wampum at the Treaty of Niagara emphasized the fact that
Aboriginal people did not intend to give up sovereignty in their negotiations with
Britain. Nor can it be asserted that the use of two-row wampum was simply another
example of misunderstanding between the parties. Borrows makes the case that the
British negotiator at Niagara, Sir William Johnson, knew full well the meaning of the
two-row wampum and its implications. 44
Borrows' work suggests that it is simply wrong to rely on the written words of treaties
and documents such as the Royal Proclamation to interpret their meaning since
reliance on text alone does not convey the true meaning of the documents themselves.
The two-row wampum is not significant because it provides a context for under-
standing what Aboriginal people thought the Treaty of Niagara to be - it is not, in
this context, an interpretative tool - rather it is, for Aboriginal people, what the text
is to those raised in Western legal traditions. To raise the text over the two-row
wampum because the common law prefers the certainty of the written word, is to make
a value choice, and that choice denigrates the equally relevant preference by
Aboriginal people for reliance on documents such as the two-row wampum. The
challenge that Borrows presents in suggesting that constitutional law be approached
from an Aboriginal perspective is that the Court must now approach matters giving
equal weight to the way in which these documents were seen by Aboriginal people
and by the Crown.
While this approach may seem somewhat radical in that it encourages the Court to
examine documents that fall outside of the traditional forms of contract-making, it
really is not that far a jump for the Court and one that is required if the Court truly
wishes to take into account the perspectives of Aboriginal people themselves. Just as
with the interpretation of other historical documents, this approach requires evidence
and reliance on experts in the field. The difference is that the experts relied upon and
the documents themselves are of a slightly different nature.
In many ways, what is being suggested is that the Court approach constitutional issues
involving Aboriginal people by asking themselves what would the reasonable
Aboriginal person at the time have understood by a particular document. This hardly
seems radical. Realizing that different people understand things in different ways and
through different means is simply an acknowledgement of reality. Giving weight to
Aboriginal ways of understanding documents such as the Royal Proclamation and
various treaties is a pre-requisite to treating Aboriginal people with the respect that
the Court suggests they deserve but have not often received from either the government
or the courts. This approach appears consistent with the Court's development of an
rows at 111. This interpretation of the two-row wampum -is consistent with the interpretation
provided by other Aboriginal elders and teachers at various meetings and gatherings attended by the
writer.
44. Supra, note 37 at 112.
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understanding of power relationships and dynamics among people that are based on,
among other things, race and gender.
45
How might this perspective have changed the Court's approach in Van der Peet. As
detailed earlier, the frozen rights approach as developed by the Court is fraught with
problems. The approach assumes that a particular result of contact, the assertion and
exercise of sovereignty over Aboriginal people by European explorers and mis-
sionaries, can be inferred from the moment of contact. The court is suggesting that
somehow, both Europeans and Aboriginal people knew that the inevitable result of
contact would be domination by Europeans. If this were not the case, why should
contact with Europeans have any more significance to Aboriginal people than contact
with other Aboriginal people?
While European explorers, traders, missionaries and settlers might have been quick
to assert sovereignty, this assertion was primarily a one-way street. While Aboriginal
people co-existed with Europeans as they co-existed with other Aboriginal peoples,
they were certainly under no impression that they had given up anything as a result of
contact. Reliance on documents such as the Royal Proclamation or various treaties to
prove a recognition of sovereignty by Aboriginal peoples, is, according to Borrows,
problematic. Aboriginal understanding of contact meant the necessity for agreements
that would guarantee co-existence. Bringing the Aboriginal perspective to the discus-
sion makes the frozen rights doctrine difficult to uphold. Rather, reliance on the
Aboriginal perspective would lead to an expansive view of "existing" rights under s.
35(1) and would certainly make the argument for extinguishment under the provisions
of Sparrow much more limited.
REALITY CHECK - THE PRACTICAL POWER OF THE COURT
The foregoing analysis suggests that the Van Der Peet decision was a serious misstep
for the Court following the ground it had broken in Sparrow. The weak reasoning used
by the Court to justify the frozen rights approach would seem to justify every concern
that Aboriginal people have voiced about the ability of the Court to resolve issues of
Aboriginal rights. There is no question that the Court deserves criticism for its
approach in Van der Peet. However, the result in Van der Peet is one that should not
really be surprising. Placing the blame for this backwards step in Aboriginal rights
solely at the feet of the Supreme Court is wrong because it ignores the reality of the
limited nature of the power of the Court and its complex relationship with the
governments of the day.
45. See for example, the judgement of Justice L'Heureux-Dube in Egan and Nesbitt v. Canada [1995] 2
S.C.R. 513 (Supreme Court of Canada) and the various judgements in R v. S (R.D.) (more popularly
known as R.D.S. v. The Queen) - File #25063, September 26, 1997 (Supreme Court of Canada). This
area is one that is clearly in its early stages of development by the Court and speculation as to where
these preliminary forays might lead are certainly premature. On the other hand, it cannot be denied
that these cases suggest that the Court is taking the first steps towards a new judicial understanding
of race, gender, and power in Canada.
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The standard view of judicial review suggests that on the one hand there is the
legislature and on the other hand the Court. The legislature makes laws, the Court
interprets those laws in light of the provisions of the Constitution. Laws that the Court
find fail to meet the standards of the Constitution are, according to s. 52 (1) of the
Constitution Act "to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." Simply put
then, the power of the legislature is to make laws, the power of the Court is to disallow
laws that offend the Constitution. Judicial review allows for checks and balances in
the system.
But where does the power of the Court come from? Of course, on one level it comes
from the Constitutional document itself. Thus in Motor Vehicle Reference, Chief
Justice Lamer rejects concerns that judicial review will excessively expand the Court's
powers by stating that these powers were given to the Court by the Constitution, they
did not represent any sort of power-grab by the Court itself.46 But this response does
not really answer the question about the Court's power. Regardless of the words
written in the Constitution Act, why is it that Court decisions are followed?
Alexander Bickel, the U.S. constitutional scholar, addressed this issue in his book The
Least Dangerous Branch.47 Bickel points out that concerns regarding the power of
judicial review and the potential for abuse by the court, are kept in check by the fact
that the Court has no real enforcement mechanisms of its own other than the political
capital it has managed to create over time with both citizens and politicians. 48 It is for
this reason that the Court is the least dangerous branch in the American triumvirate of
the Congress, the Cabinet and the Supreme Court. Unlike the former two bodies, the
Supreme Court, cannot of its own volition, compel any compliance with its decisions.
Bickel believes that this lack of enforcement power is important because it allows for
the tide of public opinion to influence the Court and to undermine decisions that appear
to go too far.
There are many examples of this phenomenon in action. Michael Mandel, in his
critique of the expansion of judicial review in Canada, The Charter of Rights and the
Legalization of Politics in Canada,49 notes that the historic decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education50 and their antecedents have had no
significant effect on desegregation of the schools in Topeka, Kansas, over 40 years
after the Court rendered its verdict. 51 Civic obstinance to the Court's decision created
46. Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, p. 497.
47. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch - The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
48. Ibid., at 28.
49. Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall &
Thompson, 1989).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (United States Supreme Court).
51. Supra, note 49 at 51.
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a situation where, despite the various orders of the Court, little of substance ever
occurred to change the real dynamics in the city.
In Canada of course, the power of the Supreme Court to overturn legislation is further
limited by the presence of s. 33 of the Constitution Act - the "notwithstanding
clause." Section 33 allows any legislature in Canada to enact laws in violation of
certain provisions of the Charter of Rights52 so long as the legislation explicitly
acknowledges that it is to operate notwithstanding the provisions of the Charter. To
date, s. 33 has only been used once, by the Province of Quebec, following the decision
of the Court regarding the use of French on signs in Ford v. Quebec.53
The fact that s. 33 has rarely been used by legislatures might be seen as a sign of the
strength of the Court. On the other hand, s. 33 is perhaps better seen as imposing real
constraints on the Court. The theory behind s. 33 is that it will rarely be used because
governments will not wish to raise the ire of voters by being seen to explicitly and
flagrantly take away rights guaranteed to them under the Charter. This fear, it has been
argued, restrains governments and means that resort is rarely made to s. 33.
This particular theory of governmental restraint - that use of s. 33 will cause a huge
political backlash - only works as long as it is not tested and found wanting. Were
legislatures to use s.33 and find that the sky does not fall down around them, then of
course, reticence to use s. 33 would vanish and it might well become a regular feature
of the political landscape. Regular and constant use of s. 33 without political implica-
tions would then seriously impair the power of the Court to overturn unconstitutional
measures enacted by the legislature.
This reality requires the Court to engage in constant dialogue with the legislature.
While the conventional image of judicial review sees the legislature in one corner and
the Court in another, each operating in isolation from each other, the need for the Court
to maintain its political power and capital requires that the two bodies speak to each
other regularly. Now of course, such speech cannot be carried out behind closed doors
in the proverbial smoky backrooms. It would be terribly improper to have politicians
tell the Court what type of decisions are likely to spur spirited and persistent cries for
the use of s. 33, and it would be equally inappropriate for judges to talk to politicians
about how far they might realistically be able to go in overturning legislation. These
constraints however, do not prevent dialogue, it just means that dialogue is carried out
slowly, over time, and in a number of relatively public forums.
The clearest way in which the Court speaks to the legislature is through its decisions.
In Ford, for example, the Court went to some lengths to suggest to the Quebec
52. Section 33 can be used to override Charter protections found in s. 2 (fundamental freedoms -
freedom of religion, speech, association) and ss. 7-15 (legal rights and equality rights). Section 33
also contains within it rules to limit the term of such constitutional exemptions without referral back
to the legislature. Section 33 cannot apply to decisions made pursuant to s. 35(1) since it is not part
of the Charter.
53. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Supreme Court of Canada).
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legislature what types of restrictions on the use of languages other than French would
be constitutionally acceptable and thus tried to provide, within the decision, an
alternative to reliance on s. 33.54 The necessity for the message was clearly the obvious
significance of the decision to the people of Quebec.
The Court understands when it is moving into areas that might engender criticism, and
it is particularly in such cases where it seeks to initiate dialogue with the public and
the legislature. For example, in R v. Daviault,55 the Court went to some lengths to
address the concerns that a finding that the principles of fundamental justice in s. 7
require that an individual be permitted to raise the defence of extreme intoxication
would create a dangerous environment in the country. For the majority, Justice Cory
indicated that first, it was open to Parliament to "fashion a remedy which would make
it a crime to commit a prohibited act while drunk, ''56 and second, that this decision
was limited to very few situations and thus would not lead to any significant increase
in danger to the public. 57
The clarity of the Court's message is reduced when decisions are seriously split and
conflicting reasons are given. 58 In addition, judicial turnover at the Supreme Court
also blunts the ability of the legislature to process what the Court is saying. 59
As noted earlier, the process engaged in here is one of dialogue. As the Court speaks
to the legislature so the legislature speaks to the Court. In the wake of the public
backlash with the Daviault decision, federal politicians indicated that they were not
54. With reference to laws restricting the language used on signs, the Court said:
"...requiring the predominant display of the French language, even its marked
predominance, would be proportional to the goal of promoting and maintaining
a French "visage linguistique" in Quebec and therefore justified under ...s.1
of the Canadian Charter..." Ibid., at 780. The province chose to ignore this advice
and relied on s. 33.
55. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
56. Ibid., at 100.
57. "In light of the experience in Australia or New Zealand, [where legislation along the
lines of that suggested by the Court was in place it cannot be said that to permit such
a defence would open the floodgates to allow every accused who had a drink before
committing the prohibited act to raise the defence of drunkenness." Ibid., at 103.
58. For example the majority in RJR-MacDonald Inc., v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 - the tobacco
advertising case - provided examples of the type of legislation that would be constitutionally valid,
however the fact that the Court split 5-4 on the matter and that there were three different majority
judgements, makes it difficult for the legislature to act upon the suggestions from the Court. A
similar situation arose in R. v. Morgentaler, [1989] 3 S.C.R. 463 where the five majority judges
wrote three judgements (2, 2, 1) with no plurality apparent.
59. What weight, if any, should the legislature put on the judgement from a judge who no longer sits on
the Bench? If the judgement is a unanimous one, then one would think that it would still carry a great
deal of weight, if it is a lone judgement, regardless of whether it is majority or minority judgement,
then it would likely carry much less weight.
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inclined to take up the Court's suggestion to enact a "wilful drunkenness" law and that
they might well prefer the law as it was prior to the decision.
A similar situation is underway now with regard to laws governing the disclosure of
therapeutic records in cases of sexual assault. In R v. O'Connor60 the Supreme Court set
down rules for the disclosure of therapeutic records to the defence by complainants in sex
assault cases. That decision too generated a great deal of concern, particularly from
women's rights advocates who felt that the ruling could both make women reluctant to
bring charges against their assailants and/or refuse to seek treatment for assaults until after
the legal process was finished. In response to the decision, Parliament passed Bill C-46
which the government hoped would go some way in meeting women's concerns. For this
reason, Bill C-46 did more than simply mirror the Court's decision in O'Connor. Now,
some trial court judges are finding the new legislation unconstitutional in that it goes
beyond what the Court set down in O'Connor. As the matter inevitably wends its way to
the highest court in the land, the judges of the Supreme Court will be able to reflect on
the need for retrenchment in light of public sentiment.
One of the advantages to both the Court and the legislature of this dialogic process is
that it takes place slowly over time. Since matters do not reach the Supreme Court
quickly, both sides can watch to see how public opinion evolves. Although some Court
decisions may be met initially with great hostility, over time, much of the discontent
may ebb, thus reducing the need for Parliament to act and for the Court to reconsider
its earlier judgements.
All of the cases referred to thus far have been criminal or quasi-criminal offences. 61
The Court has been less inclined to weigh in as dramatically on matters that fall outside
of the criminal justice realm. The Court's experience in these areas is particularly
useful in understanding their response to Aboriginal rights cases.
In areas of what might be called social policy, there is a tendency for the Court to more
easily defer to the legislature. The case of Irwin Toy v. Quebec62 is an example of the
Court relaxing its standards under the Oakes Test 63 in cases where the legislature is
mediating "between the competing claims of different groups." 64
There are a number of cases which demonstrate the Court's unease about addressing
what might be seen as social issues. Perhaps the most succinct and honest statement
60. [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
61. The RJR-MacDonald case is often thought of as a non-criminal matter since it deals with the adver-
tising of tobacco. Certainly this opinion was not held by Justice McLachlin, who noted for the
majority, that failure to follow the provisions of the statute resulted in criminal-type sanctions and
thus viewed the law as a piece of criminal law. RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 58 at 322.
62. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
63. R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. Although the Court often points out that the Oakes test is not really
a test, per se, but a set of guidelines (see R v. Keegstra, [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 735, for example) the
tendency in legal circles is to refer to it as the Oakes test.
64. Supra, note 62 at 994.
(1998) 13 Journal of Law and Social Policy
of the Court's position came from Justice Sopinka in Egan and Nesbitt v. The Queen.
In concluding his section 1 analysis of the claim by the applicants that the refusal to
extend the definition of "spouse" in the Old Age Security Act to same sex-couples he
said:
It may be suggested that the time has expired for the government to proceed to ex-
tend the benefits to same-sex couples and that it cannot justify a delay since 1975 to
include same-sex couples. While there is some force in this suggestion, it is neces-
sary to keep in mind that only in recent years have lower courts recognized sexual
orientation as an analogous ground, and this Court will have done so for the first
time in this case. While it is true, as Cory J. observes, that many provincial legisla-
tures have amended human rights legislation to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, these amendments are of recent origin. Moreover, human
rights legislation operates in the field of employment, housing, use of public
facilities and the like. This can hardly be equated with the problems faced by the
federal government which must assess the impact of extending the benefits con-
tained in some fifty federal statutes. Given the fact that equating same-sex couples
with heterosexual spouses, either married or common law, is still generally regarded
as a novel concept, I am not prepared to say that by its inaction to date the govern-
ment has disentitled itself to rely on s. 1 of the Charter.65
Perhaps the case that best illustrates the dilemma faced by the Court when venturing
into the social policy area is McKinney v. Board of Governors of the University of
Guelph.66 McKinney was a challenge to the policy of mandatory retirement. The Court
had no difficulty finding that mandatory retirement was discrimination on the basis of
age. Where the Court divided, was on whether or not such discrimination could be
upheld under s. 1. The majority of the Court opted for a deferential approach, one that
recognized that the area of mandatory retirement was now firmly entrenched in
Canadian society and where there was a welter of conflicting social science evidence
on its effects. Writing for the majority, Justice LaForest said:
What we are confronted with is a complex socio-economic problem that involves
the basic and interconnected rules of the workplace throughout the whole of our
society. As already mentioned, the legislature was not operating in a vacuum. Man-
datory retirement has long been with us; it is widespread throughout the labour
market; it involves 50% of the workforce. The legislature's concerns were with the
ramifications of changing what had for long been the rule in such important social
issues and its effect on pension plans, youth employment, the desirability of those in
the workplace to bargain for and organize their own terms of employment, the ad-
vantages flowing from expectations and ongoing arrangements about terms of
employment, including not only retirement, but seniority and tenure and, indeed al-
most every aspect of the employer-employee relationship.67
65. Egan, supra, note 45 at 576. While Sopinka might be given high marks for honesty, the notion that
enforcement of equality rights under the Charter is dependent on the ability of the group in question
to show it has made sufficient inroads into the public consciousness so as not to have their claim
seen as "novel" does seem to limit the reach of the section significantly.
66. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
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In cases such as Egan and McKinney, the perceived enormity of the steps the Court
would be taking in declaring the challenged pieces of legislation unconstitutional,
served to convince a majority of the Court that such a move would not be in the
best interests of society as a whole. One might say that in these cases, there was
no need for an ongoing dialogue, because the Court was sufficiently aware of the
implications of their decisions and what might possibly arise as a response from the
legislature.
THE SUPREME COURT AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
In light of the previous discussion, how can we best characterize the Court's decisions
in the area of Aboriginal rights? When the Supreme Court considers a case, it has
before it a series of questions it seeks to answer. Those questions are, for the most
part, resolved by a simple yes or no. This leads to the assumption that Court decisions
can best be seen as zero-sum games with one party winning and the other party losing.
It is not clear, however, that a simple winner/loser analogy truly captures the real
results of a Supreme Court decision. This is particularly the case when the Supreme
Court acts in the area of what might broadly be termed Aboriginal rights.
Since the Court's enforcement mechanisms are limited to its ability to persuade and
call upon political will, where the Court is asked to set out the broad parameters of
the rights of various parties, it is not at all clear that a victory in court will, of necessity,
translate into a victory in fact. The ability to turn a court victory into a practical victory
often lies outside of the competence of the Court itself and falls back upon the relative
strength of the parties.
In the area of Aboriginal rights, therefore, the best result that Aboriginal people can
hope for from the Court is one that gives them additional power to attempt to negotiate
the resolution of specific issues - for it is only through negotiation, not the Court,
that Aboriginal rights can truly be secured.
In general, in deciding any Aboriginal rights case the Court has two options. If it
sides with the government it means a rejection of the particular right being
advanced, if it sides with the Aboriginal applicants, it means that the applicants are
now better positioned to negotiate for what it is they went to Court to achieve in the
first place.
While the latter outcome is not nearly as conclusive an outcome as might be hoped
for, it is nevertheless significant. The obvious difficulty with Aboriginal-government
negotiations is that Aboriginal people come to the table with little to negotiate with.
If Aboriginal rights are only those rights that the government is prepared to recognize,
then the negotiation process, despite all the trappings, becomes essentially a take it or
leave it process. Unless Aboriginal people can rally a great deal of political will on
their side, real negotiations with government are not likely to occur.
67. Ibid., at 302.
(1998) 13 Journal of Law and Social Policy
From the perspective of Aboriginal litigants therefore, the role of the Supreme Court
is to provide them with some better cards to take to the table, not to determine who
wins or loses the particular game. At the same time, if the Court sees that the
government will not even come to the table after they have managed to deal the
Aboriginal players a bigger hand, then the pressure rises on the Court to retrench when
the Aboriginal litigants return for even better cards. An understanding of this process
helps explain the Court's decisions in both Sparrow and Van der Peet.
Seen in this light, the following quote from Sparrow is perhaps more understandable
now than it was when used initially in this paper:
It is clear that then, that s. 35 (1) ...represents the culmination of a long and difficult
struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition
of aboriginal rights.. .Section 35(1)., at the least, provides a solid constitutional base
upon which subsequent negotiations can take place.68
This quote illustrates that the Court understands its role in the area of Aboriginal rights
to be, at its most positive, to open the door a little wider and to push negotiations on
a little further. In a commentary on the Sparrow case, Ian Binnie reaches a similar
conclusion:
...the Court has used the occasion [of the Sparrow decision] to make comments
seemingly designed less to clarify the law than to drive government and Aboriginal
organizations alike into negotiations for fear of what...thunderbolts the Supreme
Court might (or from the Aboriginal leadership perspective, might not) hurl in fu-
ture section 35 cases. 69
The meaning of the Sparrow decision was also not lost on Georges Erasmus, at the
time of the decision National Grand Chief of the Assembly of First Nations. 70 At the
time the Sparrow decision was released Erasmus said that it strengthened the hand of
Aboriginal people in their negotiations with the government. 71
The extent to which Sparrow could be seen as potentially expanding the scope of
Aboriginal rights can be seen from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples'
interpretation of s. 35(1) in light of Sparrow. In Partners in Confederation, the first
substantive document produced by the Commission, they wrote:
There are persuasive reasons to conclude that [the Aboriginal] right of self-govern-
ment was still in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982, was enacted. As such it
qualifies as an "existing" right under section 35 (1).72
68. Supra, note 2 at 1105.
69. W.I.C. Binnie, "The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or end of the Beginning?" 15 Queens
Law Journal 217 at 219. It will be interesting to see what thunderbolts Justice Binnie will throwing
when he has the opportunity to consider his first s. 35(1) case.
70. Later of course he was named co-chair of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
71. Globe & Mail (June 1, 1990) 1.
72. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-
Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993) at 35.
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There is no doubt that the potential implications of Sparrow were quite broad. As
Binnie noted however, Sparrow itself, did not provide any detailed listing of what
existing Aboriginal rights actually were. As noted earlier, the Court stressed in its
decision that the case only applied to the Musqueam's contention that s. 35(1) allowed
them the right to fish for food and for ceremonial purposes.
Sparrow thus became the basis for the hopes of many Aboriginal people that mean-
ingful negotiations might now take place on the delineation of Aboriginal rights. For
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which had eschewed any suggestion
that issues of Aboriginal rights should be determined by way of constitutional amend-
ments in light of the failure of the Charlottetown Accord and the apparent unwilling-
ness of the Canadian populace to contemplate any more constitutional discussions,
Sparrow became the linchpin of their elaboration of Aboriginal rights.
Of course, Sparrow could also be approached from another perspective. The section
1-like limitations incorporated into s. 35(1) by the Court could be seen to suggest that
the actual reach of the decision was quite limited. For Binnie:
[in] integrating [Aboriginal] rights into the balancing act of the ordinary legal
system to the extent envisaged by Sparrow, the Court may, with hindsight, in the
eyes of some Aboriginal leaders cease being part of the solution and start becoming
a part of their problem.73
Given the Court's desire to use its decision to spur on the negotiation process, it is not
surprising that a level of ambiguity should persist as a result of the Sparrow decision.
Indeed, for the decision to have any effect on negotiations in the area of Aboriginal
rights, a level of ambiguity was essential. If one party knew that the Supreme Court
would find in its favour the next time Aboriginal rights came before it, then that party
would have little incentive to engage in any substantive negotiations.
Under the circumstances, and given its institutional limitations, it would appear that
the Court went as far as could reasonably be expected in Sparrow. By providing
Aboriginal peoples with a potentially broad range of existing Aboriginal rights, it
presumably gave them some significant cards to play. The threat that the Court might
further expand those rights in a future case would seem to provide governments with
a good incentive to wish to sit down and talk. On the other hand, by introducing a
"reasonable limits test" into s. 35(l) and providing very little guidance as to what those
limits might be, the Court also encouraged Aboriginal groups to proceed by way of
negotiation in order to develop certainty in the development of rights rather than
relying on an ad hoc, uncertain, Court driven approach.
There is no question that the combination of the decision in Sparrow and the election
of NDP governments in Ontario and British Columbia did advance the negotiation
process in those provinces. In some ways the Sparrow decision provided an external
impetus to both governments, historically sympathetic to Aboriginal issues, to enter
73. Supra, note 69 at 237-8.
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into substantive negotiations with Aboriginal groups without the fear of being labelled
"pro-Aboriginal" by the opposition. Sparrow also provided an external justification
for these governments to come to agreements with Aboriginal groups that they may
well have been willing to arrive at without the decision.
On the other hand, there were limits to what could be obtained through negotiations
with individual provinces. In Ontario, the government signed a Declaration of Political
Relations with Aboriginal political organizations that had symbolic importance but
little practical import. The province also negotiated some food hunting and food
fishing agreements in light of the dicta in Sparrow. In British Columbia as in Ontario,
Sparrow led to the conclusion of a number of agreements regarding increased
Aboriginal access and control over fisheries. In terms of more comprehensive matters,
such as treaty-making, the province did manage to successfully negotiate at least one
treaty, however the impending approach of an election and fears of political backlash
.stalled the process. The Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en First Nations put their appeal of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Delgamuukw v. B.C.74 on hold
because of the promise of substantive negotiations. After a few years of unsuccessful
discussions however, Delgamuukw was argued before the Court in 1997. The implica-
tions of the Supreme Court's decision in this case will be discussed later.
In terms of negotiations with the federal government, the major player in Aboriginal
rights matters, Sparrow had little impact. The government consistently ignored the
various reports issued by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples and also
largely ignored the Assembly of First Nations as well in terms of the negotiation
process. The government did sit down with individual First Nations to discuss
Aboriginal rights issues but these discussions were based largely on the municipal
model of the devolution of powers.
In this context, Van der Peet found its way to the Supreme Court. The Court found
itself in a difficult position. Despite its best efforts, Sparrow had not generated any
major breakthroughs in Aboriginal rights. The federal government did not take the
opportunity to use Sparrow, or the Royal Commission's various elaborations on
Sparrow, to embark upon any sort of meaningful nation-wide consideration of
Aboriginal rights. In its presentation to the Court in Van Der Peet, the government
advocated the frozen rights doctrine. Given the either/or nature of constitutional
litigation the Court was faced with two choices.
On the one hand, it could attempt to re-invigorate the non-existent negotiation process
by upping the ante in Sparrow and starting to flesh out in some detail the nature and
extent of existing Aboriginal rights. Since Van der Peet was a case where more than
a right to fish for food was being asserted, a decision in the case that could be seen to
extend Aboriginal rights potentially into the commercial realm would have great
significance.
74.. (1995) 7 B.C.L.R. (3d) 156 (B.C.C.A.).
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On the other hand, the federal government had made it clear that it was not coming to
the negotiating table even with the chance that the Court might expand its ruling in
Sparrow in future cases. Public support for Aboriginal rights appeared to wane when
people understood that Aboriginal rights might actually mean that Aboriginal people
had a preferred entitlement over non-Aboriginal people to things like the salmon
fishery. In terms of the legislature-court dialogue, the federal government's reluctance
to negotiate after Sparrow spoke volumes regarding the lack of political will that
existed for an expansion of Aboriginal rights.
Without the security of knowing that there was the political will to support its decision,
it is not surprising that the Supreme Court retrenched on the issue of Aboriginal rights
in Van der Peet. Indeed, after having been essentially rebuffed by the federal govern-
ment after Sparrow, it was unlikely that the Court was going to try to force the issue
by raising the stakes in the Aboriginal rights negotiating process.
There is no question that Van der Peet is a disappointing judgement. There is also no
question that the frozen rights theory sets back the cause of Aboriginal rights from the
theoretical heights it reached following Sparrow. At the same time, the result in Van
der Peet was certainly predictable. Rather than blaming the Supreme Court for a lack
of courage, blame would be better placed with the federal and (some) provincial
governments for lack of leadership in advancing Aboriginal issues. In the face of
political and public disinterest - not to mention potential overt hostility - it is
unrealistic to expect the Court to move forward in an area as complex as Aboriginal
rights.
For Aboriginal people, the failure of Sparrow to move the political agenda forward is
certainly disappointing. The difficulty facing those who support an expansion of
Aboriginal rights in the face of governmental intransigence is that while the Court
may be the only source, outside of public opinion, where Aboriginal people can obtain
additional bargaining power, the very fact of this intransigence makes it unlikely that
the Court will provide such relief.
POST-SCRIPT - THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
IN DELGAMUUKW
Just prior to the submission of this paper for publication, the Supreme Court of Canada
released its judgement in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.75 Delgamuukw will no
doubt spawn a raft of articles and commentaries since it represents the Court's most
comprehensive decision yet on the issue of Aboriginal title. For the purposes of this
paper, reference to Delgamuukw will focus on the way in which the decision does or
does not fit within the framework for judicial decision-making in Aboriginal-rights
cases outlined earlier.
75. S.C.C. file # 23799, judgment released December 11, 1997. As the judgement has not yet been
reported, reference to the judgement will be to the particular numbered paragraphs.
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As noted above, Delgamuukw concerned itself with issues of Aboriginal title. For the
Court, Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights are two related yet distinct concepts.
Chief Justice Lamer, writing an essentially unanimous judgement of the Court76 stated
in this regard:
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the right to engage in
specific activities which may themselves be aboriginal rights. Rather, it confers the
right to use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need be aspects of prac-
tices customs, and traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of
aboriginal societies. 77
For this reason, Delgamuukw does not really follow the Sparrow and Van der Peet line
of cases, but rather starts a new, post-s. 35 (1) jurisprudence on the issue of Aboriginal
title. While the decisions in the former two cases are relevant to the Court's decisions,
they are not binding since they did not directly concern themselves with the issue of
Aboriginal title.
Delgamuukw involved a claim by the Gitskan and We'suwet'en First Nations for a
declaration of Aboriginal title over 58,000 square kilometres of land in British
Columbia. Due to, among other things, defects in the pleadings by the applicants, and
more significantly, errors by the trial judge in placing adequate weight on evidence of
historical practices adduced by witnesses for the applicants, a new trial was ordered.
In addition to simply ordering a new trial, the Court took the opportunity to set down
some principles regarding the use of oral historical evidence and the nature of
Aboriginal title.
In terms of reliance on oral histories the Court essentially restated its position in Van
der Peet:
...the trial judge gave no independent weight to these...oral histories because [he
felt] they did not accurately convey historical truth, because knowledge about those
oral histories was confined to the communities whose histories they were and be-
cause those oral histories were insufficiently detailed. However, ...these are features,
to a greater or lesser extent, of all oral histories...The implication of the trial judge's
reasoning is that oral histories should never be given any independent weight and
are only useful as confirmatory evidence in aboriginal rights litigation. I fear that if
this reasoning were followed, the oral histories of aboriginal peoples would be con-
sistently and systematically undervalued by the Canadian legal system, in contradic-
tion of the express instruction to the contrary in Van der Peet that trial courts
interpret the evidence of aboriginal peoples in light of the difficulties inherent in ad-
judicating aboriginal claims.7 8
76. Justices Cory and Major concurred with Chief Justice Lamer, Justice McLachlin wrote a brief (one-
paragraph) judgement in which she essentially agreed with the Chief Justice, and Justice LaForest,
while agreeing with the conclusion reached by the majority, distinguished his analysis in some ways
from the majority.
77. Supra, note 75 at para. 111.
78. Ibid., para. 98.
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From an evidentiary point of view, this statement by the Court should make it easier
for Aboriginal applicants to prove Aboriginal title in future cases. The Court has not
moved however to a position along the lines of that advocated by John Borrows
outlined earlier.
In order to prove Aboriginal title, the Court set down three criteria: i) the land must
have been occupied prior to sovereignty; ii) there must be continuity between present
and pre-sovereignty occupation; and iii) occupation, at sovereignty, had to be ex-
clusive.79 In terms of viewing these criteria in light of the Sparrow and Van der Peet
line of cases the following comments can be made. Criterion three is unique to issues
of Aboriginal title, criterion two follows Van Der Peet's notion of 'continuity' and
criterion one is a departure from Van der Peet.
It will be recalled that with regard to Aboriginal rights, the Court in Van der Peet
emphasized contact as the cut-off date for the establishment of such rights. Now, in
the case of Aboriginal title, the Court is focussing on the actual date of Crown assertion
of sovereignty over the land in question. Given the many problems inherent in the Van
der Peet notion of freezing rights at contact, it might be hoped that Delgamuukw marks
a step away from this approach. The Court however made it clear that freezing
Aboriginal rights at contact is still dicta, the change in this case arose solely from the
fact that Aboriginal title is distinct from Aboriginal rights:
In order to establish a claim to aboriginal title, the aboriginal group asserting the
claim must establish that it occupied the lands in question at the time at which the
Crown asserted sovereignty over the land subject to the title. The relevant time
period for the establishment of title is, therefore, different than for the establishment
of aboriginal rights to engage in specific activities... This arises from the fact that in
defining the central and distinctive attributes of pre-existing aboriginal societies it is
necessary to look to a time prior to the arrival of Europeans. Practices, customs or
traditions that arose solely as a response to European influences do not meet the
standard for recognition as aboriginal rights.
On the other hand, in the context of aboriginal title, sovereignty is the appropriate
time period to consider for several reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint,
aboriginal title arises out of prior occupation of the land by aboriginal peoples and
out of the relationship between the common law and pre-existing systems of
aboriginal law...Second, aboriginal title does not raise the problem of distinguishing
between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs and traditions and those
influenced or introduced by European contact... Finally, from a practical standpoint,
it appears that the date of sovereignty is more certain than the date of first contact. It
is often very difficult to determine the precise moment that each aboriginal group
had first contact with European culture...80
79. Ibid., para. 143.
80. Ibid., para. 145, 146 (emphasis in original). The last point made by Chief Justice Lamer regarding
the difficulty of arriving at precisely when first contact occurred obviously is as significant in an
Aboriginal rights case as it is in an Aboriginal title case.
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Delgamuukw then goes on to discuss what follows from a finding of Aboriginal title.
This is obviously a very significant issue. In the case at bar, much of the land in
question had been alienated by the Crown in one form or another and was being used
by non-Aboriginal people for a wide variety of activities. If assertion of Aboriginal
title means that the rights to the land now revert to the original owners then clearly,
this would have a dramatic impact on land-holding in the affected area. In Sparrow,
it will be recalled, the Court imported a justificatory standard to be used in cases where
a breach of s. 35 (1) was successfully made out. As discussed earlier, this standard
bears a great resemblance to the Oakes test, used to justify government infringements
of Charter rights.
The Court made it clear, that in its opinion, there was nothing inherently improper
with any of the uses to which the land in question has been put:
The general principles governing justification laid down in Sparrow... operate with
respect to infringements of aboriginal title....the range of legislative objectives that
can justify the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad....In my opinion, the
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the en-
vironment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement
of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are
consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of
aboriginal title. Whether a particular measure or government act can be explained
by reference to one of those objectives, however, is ultimately'a question of fact that
will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.81
On the other hand, Aboriginal title would be an extremely empty vessel if virtually
any use of Aboriginal lands was justified and if Aboriginal people received no
consideration for its use. For this reason, the Court emphasized that Aboriginal
participation in the use of their land must be a part of Aboriginal title:
The exclusive nature of aboriginal title is relevant to the degree of scrutiny of the
infringing measure or action...What is required is that the government
demonstrate..."both that the process by which it allocated the resource and the ac-
tual allocation of the resource which results from that process reflect the prior inter-
est" of the holders of aboriginal title in the land. ...this might entail, for example,
that governments accommodate the participation of aboriginal peoples in the
development of the resources of British Columbia, that the conferral of fee simples
for agriculture, and of leases and licences for forestry and mining reflect the prior
occupation of aboriginal title lands, that economic barriers to aboriginal uses of
their lands (e.g., licensing fees) be somewhat reduced. This list is illustrative and not
exhaustive...No doubt, there will be difficulties in determining the precise value of the
aboriginal interest in the land and any grants, leases or licences given for its exploita-
tion. These difficult economic considerations obviously cannot be solved here.
Moreover, the other aspects of aboriginal title suggest that the fiduciary duty may
be articulated in a manner different than the idea of priority [as was done in Spar-
row] ...First, aboriginal title encompasses within it a right to choose to what ends a
81. lbid, para. 165.
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piece of land can be put ...This aspect of aboriginal title suggests that the fiduciary
relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples may be satisfied by the in-
volvement of aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to their lands. There
is always a duty of consultation. Whether the aboriginal group has been consulted is
relevant to determining whether the infringement of aboriginal title is justified, in
the same way that the Crown's failure to consult an aboriginal group with respect to
the terms by which reserve land is leased may breach its fiduciary duty at common
law.. .The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the circumstan-
ces. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will
be no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect
to lands held pursuant to aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when
the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the
aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be significantly
deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an
aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations
in relation to aboriginal lands.8 2
The other aspect of Aboriginal title revolves around compensation for the use of land.
Given the fiduciary duty of the Crown to Aboriginal peoples, some compensation
would be expected:
...aboriginal title, unlike the aboriginal right to fish for food, has an inescapably
economic aspect, particularly when one takes into account the modem uses to
which lands held pursuant to aboriginal title can be put. The economic aspect of
aboriginal title suggests that compensation is relevant to the question of justification as
well...Indeed, compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty are a well-established part of
the landscape of aboriginal rights.. In keeping with the duty of honour and good faith on
the Crown, fair compensation will ordinarily be required when aboriginal title is infr-
inged. The amount of compensation payable will vary with the nature of the par-
ticular aboriginal title affected and with the nature and severity of the infringement
and the extent to which aboriginal interests were accommodated. ... In the cir-
cumstances, it is best that we leave those difficult questions to another day.83
After setting out the nature of Aboriginal title, providing guidance for how proof of
such title can be made and discussing issues of justification and compensation, the
Chief Justice concluded his decision with a plea that reflected back on the Court's
earlier remarks in Sparrow regarding the advantages of negotiated settlements: 84
Finally, this litigation has been both long and expensive, not only in economic but
in human terms as well. By ordering a new trial, I do not necessarily encourage the
parties to proceed to litigation and to settle their dispute through the courts. As was
82. Ibid, paras. 167, 168.
83. Ibid, para. 169.
84. LaForest, in his judgement, echoed the call for negotiated settlements:
"I wish to emphasize that the best approach in these types of cases is a process of
negotiation and reconciliation that properly considers the complex and competing
interests at stake." Ibid., para. 207.
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said in Sparrow.. s. 35(1) "provides a solid constitutional base upon which sub-
sequent negotiations can take place". Those negotiations should also include other
aboriginal nations which have a stake in the territory claimed. Moreover, the Crown
is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in
good faith. Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give
and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve
what I stated in Van derPeet, supra, at para. 31, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1) -
"the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty
of the Crown". Let us face it, we are all here to stay. 85
Among advocates for Aboriginal rights, Delgamuukw has been hailed in much the
same way that Sparrow was when it was released. 86 Indeed, Delgamuukw has many
parallels with Sparrow. Like Sparrow, it does not actually decide the merits of a
particular case, but rather sets out the criteria that courts must consider in making such
decisions. In doing so, the Court hands to Aboriginal people some better cards to take
to the table, particularly around easing the burden of proof of Aboriginal title.
Delgarnuukw makes the Court's preference for negotiated settlements even clearer
than it was in Sparrow. In addition to the admonitions to resolve issues around the
table, the Court has, as it did in Sparrow, tried to inject enough uncertainty in the
process to encourage both sides to negotiate. While apparently making the way easier
to recognize Aboriginal title, the Court made it clear that a finding of Aboriginal title
would likely not disturb current landholders. On the other hand, a finding of Aboriginal
title would have to carry with it some degree of consultation and likely compensation.
By leaving these issues in the realm of generality, the Court refused to tip its hand
with respect to future decisions.
It is hoped that all the parties concerned in this particular case, the First Nations and
the provincial and federal governments will take the opportunity provided by the Court
to re-enter into negotiations and to see matters through to a satisfactory resolution.
Governments can certainly use the decision to explain to their constituents why
negotiations must be restarted and why a negotiated settlement is preferable to the
vagaries of a Court-imposed resolution. On a broader level, Delgamuukw might well
set the stage for the resolution of other cases where Aboriginal title is at stake.
Should negotiations fail however, one would be hard-pressed to state with any
confidence what type of Court-ordered resolution might be imposed. Van der Peet did
not appear to be the logical next step following Sparrow - who knows what might
emerge in Delgamuukw H. The Van der Peet experience would suggest that betting on
a clear victory for Aboriginal peoples would be a long-shot.
85. Ibid., para. 186.
86. In reaction to the judgement Phil Fontaine, Grand Chief of the Assembly of First Nations said:"What
it does is send a clear message to all of Canada" New York Times, (12 December, 1997). Joe
Mathias, Chief of the Squamish First Nation in British Columbia said: "The Supreme Court of
Canada has restored a measure of faith in aboriginal people in British Columbia in the legal system"
Vancouver Sun,(12 December, 1997).
